This paper connects coalgebra with a long discussion in the foundations of game theory on the modeling of type spaces. We argue that type spaces are coalgebras, that universal type spaces are final coalgebras, and that the modal logics already proposed in the economic theory literature are closely related to those in recent work in coalgebraic modal logic. In the other direction, the categories of interest in this work are usually measurable spaces or compact (Hausdorff) topological spaces. A coalgebraic version of the construction of the universal type space due to Heifetz and Samet [4] is generalized for some functors in those categories. Since the concrete categories of interest have not been explored so deeply in the coalgebra literature, we have some new results. We show that every functor on the category of measurable spaces built from constant functors, products, coproducts, and the probability measure space functor has a final coalgebra. Moreover, we construct this final coalgebra from the relevant version of coalgebraic modal logic. Specifically, we consider the set of theories of points in all coalgebras and endow this set with a measurable and coalgebra structure.
for his introduction of type spaces in a a three-part paper published in 1967 and 1968 [3] . He showed how to convert a game with incomplete information into one with complete yet imperfect information. This matter is not relevant to our paper, but three related points are noteworthy. First, Harsanyi's notion of types goes further than what we described above: an agent's type gives us their beliefs about the types of the other agents. Second, despite this circularity, the informal concept of a type (as a "pool" from which all players can be picked) is widespread in areas of non-cooperative game theory and economic theory. And finally, the formalization of type spaces was, and to some extent still is, an open area. That is, Harsanyi did not really formalize type spaces in his original paper; this was left to later researchers. Getting back to our very rough informal description above, what exactly are "beliefs"? And how can a structure contain types which give rise to beliefs about other types? What is the relation of this to the infinite hierarchy of beliefs about beliefs about · · · beliefs about the world? Can we characterize the space of all possible types? So there is a collection of papers on this matter, starting with Böge and Eisele's paper [1] from 1979. Again, we are not much concerned with these conceptual matters in this paper. Most of the important papers for our study are technical contributions dealing with the matter of universal type spaces. A universal type space is intended to capture all possible types, so it is an answer to our third question above.
There are some clear conceptual clues that coalgebra could be connected to type spaces. The first is that the notion of "belief" in the game theory literature is typically a probabilistic one. If we replace "belief" with "knowledge" above, then we have a very-well-studied notion, the formalization of knowledge by possible worlds semantics. The mathematical structures for possible worlds semantics are sets W of worlds with two functions, one giving for each world w ∈ W some set of "atomic propositions" true at w, and the other giving for each w some set of worlds which are said to be "possible from w". These structures are essentially the coalgebras in the category Set of sets of the functor F (W ) = A × P(W ), where A is the power set of the set of atomic propositions and P is the power set functor on sets. Perhaps the primary contribution of coalgebra to this area to date is to show that modal logic, the natural logical language for the structures, generalizes to coalgebraic versions of modal logic. We'll return to this point shortly.
The second clue has to do with the role of the universal type space in this field. Types are taken to be elements of the universal type space. In the universal type space all possible types are uniquely represented, and the idea is that two types with exactly the same beliefs about the underlying world of "nature" plus the types of the other players are taken to be undistinguishable. This is the same ideology as we find concerning final coalgebras, in which (as is well known) points with the same behavior are identified.
Returning to type spaces, we recall that the usual modeling of belief in game theory is via probability. So we would expect that type spaces should be probabilistic versions of Kripke models. One should replace the functor P with something like ∆, where ∆(W ) = {µ | µ is a probability measure on W }.
Indeed, this is the case: most proposals in the literature do end up studying certain mappings from a space X to some variation of the functor ∆ applied to X. This is our third clue of the connection. But note that (1) leaves a lot lacking: if W is just a set, how do we know that it has any probability measures? Does it matter which σ-algebra we use? And if W is an object in some other category, say measurable spaces or compact metric spaces, then what structure do we put on ∆(W )?
We intend this paper to be a contribution to this area by connecting it with coalgebra. Here are the main conceptual claims of the paper, as well as the main results:
⋆ The original notion of a Harsanyi type space may be taken to be a coalgebra of a functor F on Meas I , where Meas is the category of measurable spaces and measurable maps, and I is a discrete category (of agents). But this reformulation is not obvious, because the original notion had an extra condition that the agents "know their own type." We discuss this in Section 2.
⋆ Universal type spaces are final coalgebras.
⋆ The constructions of universal type spaces in the literature are related to constructions found in coalgebra. However, there are differences due primarily to the fact that the work is going on in categories like Meas rather that Set. Putting things differently, the universal type space constructions could be generalized, and this could be of interest in coalgebra.
⋆ There are versions of coalgebraic modal logic for functors of interest, and one can prove the existence of final coalgebras by considering the satisfied theories in these logics. This construction parallels the construction of a final coalgebra on Set for F (W ) = A × P(W ) (or rather A × P f in (W ), using the finite power set functor) using the set of descriptions of all modal theories of all possible worlds. We work a formulation of coalgebraic modal logic based on the one due to Jacobs [6] , following work of Rößiger [9, 10] . But we do differ from these papers in that our final coalgebras are not connected to logical theories, but to the theories realized in coalgebras. In the economic literature, this construction is due to Heifetz and Samet [4] .
⋆ We formulate a notion of "measure polynomial functor" on Meas. We prove a new result in Section 3: every such polynomial has a final coalgebra with carrier consisting of sets of sets of sentences in a logic. The method also works for polynomial functors on Set, as we show in Section 5.2. Our work also gives a new proof of the result of Kupke, Kurz, and Venema [7] that the Vietoris polynomial endofunctors on the category of Stone spaces have final coalgebras. Our proof is probably implicit in [7] ; their paper derives the result from the study of a great deal of structure, and we have not (yet) needed to do the analogous work in our settings.
Background notions
A measurable space is a pair M = (M, Σ), where M is a set and Σ is a σ-algebra of subsets of M . The sets in Σ are called measurable sets or events. Usually Σ contains all singletons {x}; we shall almost always assume a weaker condition that for each x ∈ M , {x} is the intersection of the measurable subsets of M containing x. A collection B of subsets of M generates a σ-algebra Σ if Σ is the smallest σ-algebra including B. A measure on M is a σ-additive function µ : Σ → [0, ∞]. The measure µ is a probability measure if µ(M ) = 1. A morphism of measurable spaces f :
This gives a category Meas. Meas has products and coproducts; indeed it has much more structure. There is an endofunctor ∆ : Meas → Meas defined by: ∆(M ) is the set of probability measures on M with the σ-algebra generated by {β p (E) : p ∈ [0, 1], E ∈ Σ}, where
Here is how ∆ acts on morphisms. If f : M → N is measurable, then for µ ∈ ∆(M ) and A ∈ Σ ′ , (∆f )(µ)(A) = µ(f −1 (A)). That is, (∆f )(µ) = µ • f −1 . For more on the functorial aspects of ∆, including important points on a related monad, see Giry [2] . We also note some additional structure. First, there is a natural transformation δ : Id → ∆ defined by δ M (m)(E) = 1 if m ∈ E and 0 if m / ∈ E. We also write δ m instead of δ M (m); this is the Dirac measure supported at m. 
Lemma 1.2 Suppose that the collection B of sets generates Σ. Then the σ-algebra on ∆(M ) is the generated by the sets of the form {β p (E) | E ∈ B and p ∈ [0, 1]}.
We also need at some point to look more closely at products in Meas. Given two measurable spaces, A and B, their product is the cartesian product of the sets A and B, endowed with the σ-algebra generated by the "rectangles" obtained as cartesian product of a measurable subset of A times a measurable subset of B. With this σ-algebra, both projections are measurable. For a subset E ⊆ A × B, the sections of E are the sets:
Each section of a measurable subset of the product is measurable.
If µ is a probability measure on A and ν a probability measure on B, we can define the probability measure
Going in the other direction, a probability measure µ on A × B induces via the projections, a measure on each of the factor spaces. These measures are called marginals, and denoted by
Lemma 1.3 Let µ be a probability measure on a product measurable space A × B.
Formulation of Type Spaces as Coalgebras
The first constructions of Harsanyi type spaces were based on a hierarchy of beliefs. In this hierarchical approach, as seen for example in [8] , types are constructed by detailing the players' beliefs about nature, about the other players' beliefs about nature, etc. Since each type gives a probability measure on the set of all types, there is a function from types to probability measures on states of nature and types. As we noted before, this is almost a coalgebra, except that there are some extra conditions imposed on these functions.
At this point, we need to formulate the category of interest. Fix a set I of players. We assume that 0 / ∈ I and we then define I 0 = I ∪ {0}. This "0" stands for "nature", and so I 0 includes nature as one of the players (but one who won't have beliefs about the other players).
We consider I and I 0 as discrete categories. Usually I is finite, but nothing we do hinges on this.
We shall be interested in Meas I . The objects here are familes X = (X i ) i∈I of measurable spaces, and the morphisms are also tuples of measurable maps. Fix a measurable space M to represent the "states of nature", and write X 0 for M . Each player should have beliefs about nature and about the beliefs of the other player. This leads to the following definition.
Let C : Meas I → Meas be the functor given by
At first glance, it might look like what we want is to consider for each x i ∈ X i , a probability measure on CX. However, this is not what we want because it misses an important intuition concerning type spaces. This is that players should know their own types. In other words, each player i should only have beliefs about the (joint distribution on) other players' beliefs; i's own beliefs should not even enter in. Thus we define functors U i : Meas I → Meas given by
U i acts the obvious way on morphisms. Note that U i depends on the space M of nature, even though our notation does not mention this. Now CX = U i X × X i up to isomorphisms. The fact we mentioned above, about player i knowing her own type is modeled in [4] by adding the condition that the corresponding measure on CX has marginal δ x i on X i . Here is where Lemma 1.3 plays a role allowing us to recast type spaces as coalgebras: it is essentially the same to consider measures on U i X and measures on CX for which the marginal on X i is a Dirac measure on a point (and we can easily tell which point that would be).
Finally our main innovation and the one that lets us model type spaces as coalgebras is to work in Meas I , rather than working with the product of the different spaces considered. Let F : Meas I → Meas I be defined by
As before ∆ is the probability measure space functor, and once again, our notation elides the underlying space M of nature.
This way, instead of having a family of functions in Meas, each one of them with a condition on one of its marginals, any morphism in Meas I works as a coalgebra structure. The particular functor we use automatically takes care of the condition on marginals.
Definition A Harsanyi type space (over M ) is a coalgebra for the functor F in the category Meas I . A universal type space is a final coalgebra for F in Meas I . The points of CX are called states of the world. A point of X i is called an i-type.
Our main result here is that there is a universal Harsanyi type space. Our proof follows that of Heifetz and Samet [4] . (However, they did not formulate type spaces as coalgebras.) In order to make the ideas more transparent, and also because the method is much more general, we shall temporarily forget about all of the machinery involved in the multi-player setting. Instead, we consider functors on Meas built using ∆. We show in Section 3 below that each such functor has a final coalgebra.
Coalgebraic Modal Logic for Functors on Measurable Spaces

Syntax and Semantics
Definition The class of measure polynomial functors is the smallest class of functors on Meas containing the identity, each measurable spaces M and closed under products, coproducts, and ∆.
For a measure polynomial functor T , we define Ing(T ), the ingredients of T , by the following recursion: For a "constant" space M ,
, and similarly for U + V ; Ing(∆S) = {∆S} ∪ Ing(S). Each T has only finitely many ingredients.
Syntax We define just below a language L(T ). The language is sorted, and the sorts are the ingredients of T . We write ϕ : S to mean that ϕ is a formula of sort S; when we need it, we let Form S denote the set of such formulas.
3. If S ∈ Ing(T ) and ϕ, ψ : S, then also ϕ ∧ ψ : S and ¬ϕ : S.
6. If ∆S ∈ Ing(T ) and ϕ : S and p ∈ [0, 1], then β p ϕ : ∆S.
Semantics Let c : X → T X be a coalgebra of T . The semantics assigns to each S ∈ Ing(T ) and each ϕ :
The notation Pf (A) indicates throughout the paper the image under f of the set A.
S is always a measurable subset of SX. In the sequel, we shall omit the superscripts on the pairing, inl , and inr operators, since they are mostly clear from the context. We also will occasionally omit the superscript c and the sort subscript when dealing with the semantics of ϕ : S on a particular coalgebra c : X → T X.
Remark As we mentioned, if M is a measurable space, then the measurable subsets of M are taken as formulas. This departs from most of the treatments in coalgebraic modal logic, where one would take the elements of M as formulas; these formulas are then interpreted by singletons. Our treatment here makes for a more expressive language. We feel that when dealing with a space like [0, 1], one might want to have a set denoting a subinterval or a measurable subset of it. Also, there is a technical advantage: at various points, it will be good to know that the set of interpretations of formulas of all sorts coincide with the measurable subsets. To get this, one clearly must start with the measurable subsets of the constants. The only price we pay for this is that we require that all spaces be separative: that is, for each
The description operations, and the canonical spaces
For each coalgebra c : X → T X and each x ∈ SX, we define
In the terminology of this paper's title, each such set d c S (x) is a satisfied theory. For each S ∈ Ing(T ), we define S * , the canonical domain of sort S, to be the following measurable space. In each case, the underlying set is
Note that each S * is a set; indeed it has cardinality at most 2 cλ , where c = 2 ℵ 0 is the cardinality of the continuum, and λ is the is maximum of the cardinalities of the sets of measurable subsets of the constant functors in Ing(T ). Usually we will use letters like s for elements of S * . For the σ-algebra, we first take the boolean algebra of subsets of S * of the form
This is a boolean algebra because the language has boolean operations interpreted classically. Then the σ-algebra on each S * is the one generated by this boolean algebra. (Incidentally, each S * is separative:
Lemma 3.2 For all c : X → T X, all S ∈ Ing(T ):
3.3 The maps r S : S * → S(Id * )
We introduce some notation for the statement below and for the sequel. For ϕ : S, let ϕ = Pr S (|ϕ|).
Lemma 3.3
There is a family of measurable maps r S : S * → S(Id * ) indexed by the ingredients of T such that the following hold:
a. For all coalgebras c : X → T X the diagram below commutes:
b. r S is injective.
c. The σ-algebra on S(Id * ) is generated by the sets ϕ for ϕ : S.
Proof The maps r S : S * → S(Id * ) are defined by recursion on Ing(T ). For S = Id , we take r S to be the identity on Id * . For the constant functor M , recall that we are assuming that M is separative. It follows that for each m ∈ M * there is a unique x ∈ M such that m ⊇ {A ∈ M : x ∈ A}. (Note that since we have boolean connectives even in the formulas of constant sort, we in fact will not have equality here.) We define r M : M * → M so that r M (m) is the unique x with this property. Then r M is a bijection preserving measurability in both directions.
Before going further, we must explain this notation a bit. If s ∈ (U × V ) * , then s contains formulas of the form ϕ, ψ where ϕ : U and ψ : V . But s contains formulas not of this shape: boolean combinations of formulas of the form ϕ, ψ . So by π 1 (s) we mean the set of ϕ : U such that for some ψ : V , ϕ, ψ ∈ s. Similar remarks apply to π 2 (s), of course. We omit all the details of the verification of (a)-(c), only noting one equation that we establish here and use later: r
Coproducts We omit in this extended abstract all details concerning the coproduct construction.
From descriptions of measures to measures on descriptions The inductive step for ∆S is the most involved in this lemma. So assume that we have r S for S. Let s ∈ (∆S) * . To define r ∆S s, it is enough by the induction hypothesis, part (c), to define its value on each subset of S(Id * ) of the form ϕ, where ϕ here ranges over formulas of sort S. We provisionally define r ∆S s on each set ϕ by
We now establish an important property of this provisional definition. Let c : X → T (X) be a coalgebra, and let µ ∈ ∆S(X) be such that s = d c ∆S (µ). We claim that
Note that {y ∈ SX | d c S (y) ∈ |ϕ|} is measurable by Lemma 3.2. Let q be the value on the left, and let p be the value on the right. By Lemma 3.
Thus q ≤ p. But in the other direction, note that β p ϕ ∈ s by definition of p. And again since
We conclude that p = q, establishing (7).
We now use the induction hypothesis Sd c Id = r S • d c S and the injectivity of r S to re-write (7) as ∆Sd
So we may now officially define r ∆S s = ∆Sd c Id (µ) for any µ with s = d c ∆S (µ). We are sure to get a measure this way. Moreover, the definition is independent of the particular µ. (For suppose that if ν, too, is such that
But then ∆Sd c
Id (µ) and ∆Sd c Id (ν) agree on the generators of the σ-algebra on ∆S(Id * ). So we would have ∆Sd c
Id (µ) = ∆Sd c Id (ν), as desired.) And we now know that each triangle as in (3) commutes. We emphasize that (6) holds for all ϕ : S. We continue by checking that r ∆S is measurable. The σ-algebra on ∆S(Id * ) is generated by the sets
for ϕ : S and p ∈ [0, 1]. The inverse image under r ∆S of this set is {s ∈ (∆S) * | β p ϕ ∈ s} = |β p ϕ| ∆S , and this is measurable in (∆S) * . Reading this the other way, we can see that the σ-algebra on ∆S(Id * ) is generated by the sets Pr ∆ (|ψ|), as ψ runs through formulas of sort ∆S.
We conclude by checking the injectivity of r ∆S . Suppose that r ∆S s = r ∆S t. Then the two sets s and t agree on all formulas of the form β p ϕ. An easy induction shows that they agree on all boolean combinations of such formulas. So s and t agree on all formulas of sort ∆S. Thus they are the same set. ⊣
The canonical model of L(T )
At this point, we are almost ready to define the canonical model. We need a preliminary concept first. For each s ∈ Id * , let
Lemma 3.4 For each s ∈ Id * , next −1 (s) ∈ T * . Moreover, this defines a measurable injective function next −1 : Id * → T * .
We define c * :
Note that c * is injective. We shall show that c * is a final T -coalgebra. As our title indicates, we build final coalgebras from satisfied theories.
In the statement and proof of the Truth Lemma below, recall that for ϕ : S, ϕ denotes Pr S (|ϕ|). 
Proof By induction on ϕ.
The base case concerns a measurable subset A of some M ∈ Ing(T ). Recall that r M :
The steps for true Id and the boolean connectives are easy. We omit the inductive step for inl ϕ : U + V .
The inductive step for ϕ, ψ : U × V is similar. Our induction hypothesis is that
Here is the inductive step for sentences β p ϕ of sort ∆S. For all s ∈ (∆S) * , we have the following equivalences: This completes the proof. ⊣
The Final Coalgebra Theorem
We end this section by proving that each measure polynomial functor T has a final coalgebra.
Let X = (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ), and let c : X → FX be a coalgebra of F. The semantics assigns to each S ∈ Ing(F) and each ϕ : S a subset [ 
. Finally, suppose that ϕ : U 3 so that β p ϕ :
For a F-coalgebra X, and S ∈ Ing(F),
We also define |ϕ| S and S * just as before, using the sets |ϕ| S as the generators of the σ-algebra on S 
c. The σ-algebra on S(Pr * 1 , Pr * 2 , Pr * 3 ) is generated by the sets ϕ for ϕ : S.
The proof follows closely the work outlined in Lemma 3.3. Notice that as defined here, all the ingredients of F are functors from Meas I to Meas. As the reader has probably guessed, the work here can be generalized to polynomials on Meas I . These are I-indexed family of functors T i : Meas I → Meas built from the projections, constants for separative spaces, products and sums, and ∆. The work in this section generalizes to show that each polynomial on Meas I has a final coalgebra. The details are not much more than what we have seen.
Further Variations and Extensions of the Basic Construction
We have already seen the main construction of final coalgebras for the polynomials on Meas built from separative spaces. We also saw (by example) how to generalize this to systems, thereby building the universal Harsanyi type spaces. The rest of the paper offers variations and extensions of the basic technique.
Extension: Non-separative Spaces
The main point of working with separative spaces is that the points of such a space may be recovered from the σ-algebra (as the set of all singleton intersections) and from the satisfied theories in our language. This allowed us to have a language for the measurable subsets of various spaces. In the absence of separativity, we need to do more work. For each S ∈ Ing(T ), we need two different sorts of formulas. We call these Form pt (S) and Form set (S), for the points and sets of sort S, respectively. If M ∈ Ing(T ) is a constant functor, then and also constructions for coproducts. These are as expected, as is the semantics in each case. Where things are a little different is with ∆. Here if ϕ ∈ Form set (S) and p ∈ [0, 1], then β p ϕ ∈ Form pt (∆S). The reason for this is that a measure µ on S is specified by the values µ(E) for events E, not points. We also take Form pt (∆S) and Form set (∆S). In this setting, we have for each S and each coalgebra c two description functions. We define the spaces S * by taking the points to be the satisfied theories of sort Form pt (S) and then by endowing this set with a σ-algebra derived from the satisfied theories of sort Form set (S). To keep this abstract short, we omit all the details here.
Variation: Finite Kripke Polynomials on Set
In this section, we check that the same method gives representations for final coalgebras for functors on Set built from the identity functor, the finite power set functor, product and coproduct, fixed (finite or infinite) sets, and functions from a fixed set.
To avoid double subscripts or confusion with our notation P for the power set functor, we shall use Q for the finite power set functor on Set. Being a functor, we shall apply Q to functions as well as sets, writing, e.g., Qr(X) for the image r[X] of the finite set X under r.
Our syntax is constructed so that if A ∈ Ing(T ), then each element a ∈ A is a formula of sort A. Further, if QS ∈ Ing(T ) and ϕ : S, then 2ϕ : QS.
In our semantics, we define [[a] ] c A = {a}, and also
One then checks that on each coalgebra, [[ϕ] ] is always a set. Most of the rest of the results go through with only minor changes, dropping the word "measurable" and anything having to do with the measure space structure. The only differences are in Lemma 3.3 and the Truth Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 5.1 For each S ∈ Ing(T ), there is a bijective map r S : S * → S(Id * ) such that for all coalgebras c :
The proof here is not an immediate adaptation from Lemma 3.3 above. The argument for Lemma 5.1 is more along the lines of classical work in modal logic, as is the argument for the key inductive step in the Truth Lemma below. 
Variation: Vietoris Polynomial Functors on Stone
We next consider the same general results for the Vietoris polynomial functors on the category of Stone spaces. For all relevant definitions, see Kupke, Kurz, and Venema [7] . We shall use the following definitions. If X is a Stone space, we let K(X) denote the set of compact subsets of X. For any K ⊆ X, 2K denotes is the set of all compact subsets of K. Further, 3K denotes the set of all compact subsets of X whose intersection with K is non-empty. 
To see this, let z ∈ Y . As we know, whenever ϕ is such that 2ϕ ∈ y, we have z ∈ [[ϕ]] c S ; in other words, d S (z) ∈ |ϕ|. Since ϕ is arbitrary, d S (z) belongs to the right side of (14). In the other direction, suppose that z ∈ S * is such that z belongs to |ϕ| whenever x ∈ |2ϕ|. We claim that for some w ∈ Y , z = d S (w). For if not, then for each w ∈ Y there is some ψ w : S such that ψ w ∈ z and ¬ψ w ∈ d S (w). It follows that So at this point, we know (14). Recall the general fact that the image of a compact set under a continuous map is compact. These imply that the definition of r VS (x) in (13) is a compact subset of S * . We still must show that for all coalgebras c, r VS • d c VS = VSd c Id . The argument at this point is the same as the one in Lemma 5.1.
Next, we show that r VS is injective. Suppose that y = y ′ belong to (VS) * . We claim first that there must be some ψ : S such that 2ψ ∈ y ′ and 2ψ / ∈ y (or vice-versa). For if y and y ′ agreed on all 2ϕ formulas, then they would agree on all boolean combinations of such formulas, and hence they would be equal. So fix 2ψ ∈ y ′ \ y. Also, fix c : X → T X, and let Y ∈ VS(X) be such that
However, since 2ψ ∈ y ′ , we have 2ϕ∈y ′ |ϕ| ⊆ |ψ|. Recall that d S (z) / ∈ |ψ|. A fortiori, d S (z) / ∈ 2ϕ∈y ′ |ϕ|. Finally, since r S is injective, it follows that r S (d S (z)) / ∈ r VS (y ′ ). We conclude that r VS (y) = r VS (y ′ ). This concludes the verification that r VS is injective.
We check now that r VS is continuous. By Lemma 5.4, we need only consider the sets 2ϕ and 3ϕ for ϕ : S and check that the inverse images under r VS of such sets are open in (VS) * . Then for all y ∈ (VS) * , r VS (y) ∈ 2ϕ iff r VS (y) ⊆ ϕ iff y ∈ |2ϕ|
So the inverse image of 2ϕ is the open set |2ϕ|. It also follows from the calculation above that r VS (y) ∈ 3ϕ iff r VS (y) / ∈ 2¬ϕ iff y / ∈ |2¬ϕ| iff y ∈ |¬2¬ϕ|
We conclude that the inverse image of 3ϕ is open. Finally, the collection S of sets ϕ for ϕ : VS includes the collections of sets 2ϕ and 3ϕ. Also, S is closed under intersection. So it forms a basis of the Vietoris topology on V(S(Id * )) = (VS)(Id * ). ⊣
Other spaces
We are confident that the technique here extends to other kinds of concrete categories, such as compact Hausdorff spaces and the Borel probability measure with the weak * -topology. This case had been studied in relation to type spaces beginning with [1] . Indeed, we hope to expand the technique as much as possible in the coming months.
Conclusion and future directions
This paper has had two overall points. First, we connect work in the economics/game theory area with coalgebras. We feel that most, if not all, of the contructions of universal type spaces and related objects may be obtained by our method. We intend that the final version of our paper will show this. The more common method in the area is to construct an ω op -limit and then follow this by a subspace construction. Though we did not discuss the matter here, we feel that the our method is somewhat simpler. As we have indicated, it generalizes easily to other settings. We also already generalized known results from particular functors to polynomials. Since the theories here are connected to logic, it should be possible to formulate logical systems for all the functors involved and prove completeness theorems. But this we leave to future work. The construction of using satisfied theories to obtain final coalgebras is quite old in the area of coalgebra and its predecessors. For coalgebras per se, one can find it in Rutten [11] . The technique is perhaps implicit in Kurz, Kupke, and Venema [7] ; this paper also contains a note that Jacobs' final coalgebra result in [6] for Kripke polynomials on Set contains an error. Our result does not use maximal consistent sets in a logical system but rather the satisfied theories. This is simpler, though of course one must do more work to get completeness results. From the side of coalgebra, perhaps what is most original here is taking a language for sets as opposed to (or, in addition to) a language of points. The interplay of the two languages is well worth studying.
